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Abstract 
In this study, we aim to bring up making meaningful the financial budgetary development which assert the financial 
alterations of budgets in EU express a powerful important to ensure the balance of countries that are in Euro Area. 
Therefore, as aimed at our research the general location of government budget positions related to the fiscal 
federalism that are formed via “interest expenditures”, “gross debt” and “deferred liabilities” from last year’s take 
important place to analyses and put forth budgetary developments in the scope of Euro Zone. In the other hand, 
how the budgets of EU member countries effect on the Eurozone is important matter due to the financial alterations 
related to these countries’ budget because this structural fact constitutes the affect levels that maniple on the Euro 
Area. Even more, the structural importance of the fiscal federalism is that come from the concept related to the 
effected general economic growth levels such as connected with each country government expenditures and 
revenues contributes in EU. Certainly, this concept determines its structural contribution levels to ensure and 
maintain Eurozone harmonization, and the assumption and no-assumption financial alterations or the concerned 
aims are shaped by these the denominators impact that reflect also computed in terms of potential GDP. Especially 
to the EU's future, it appears that the whole financial budgetary positive alteration access in the fiscal federalism 
process can set to important role to reduce the weight of financial total national tax burden. 
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1. Introduction 
The concept of public budget related to fiscal federalism is a very important concept for ensuring the financial 
alignment of all the full member European Union countries and for a stable Euro application. The use of different 
currencies by the member countries and the different levels of development of each member state cause different 
budget deficits and have negative effects on common currency principles. The studies on this subject have been 
confirmed in the scope of concerned approaches as an important structural alteration scale concerning fiscal 
federalism. In addition to the work of the European Commission, other academic studies have shown very different 
and striking results. Nevertheless, the negative consequences of the separation from the common currency by the 
UK's Brexit application from the constituent countries have created important new dynamics open to discussion. 
One of the most important determinations of these studies is the study of the European Commission (2018-a). In 
this study, it is observed that the effects of future economic forecasts on the budget and the effects of possible 
change in Eurozone2 are being analysed.  
The effects of macro changes on EU countries and their position in shaping future EU policies constitute the 
main theme of this study. In addition, the European Commission, "European Business Cycle Indicators", which 
was conducted in 2017 as a technical study with a monetary work cycles, should also be touch upon. In this study, 
especially the structural relations between the financial change trends of the member countries and the federal 
fiscal developments’ affect levels were emphasized. In this study, the correlation of member countries with public 
budgets was found to be quite significant. Among the studies on the subject, Rosiak's study (2015) has an important 
place in the study as the concerned matter. In this study, the question of whether a larger budget increase is needed 
in the Europa Area is questioned and the existence of a fiscal federalism in the Eurozone area is analysed. The 
question that the increasing budget limits of the member countries should be questioned with the economic growth 
limits constitutes the main theme of this study. Furthermore, Oreziak's (2018) study seems to have a meaningful 
place in the last period, especially on fiscal federalism and the studies on the autonomous budget preferences of 
the member countries.  
                                                           
1 Assoc. Prof. Dr., Public Finance Department, Faculty of Economic and Business Administration, Bandirma Onyedi Eylul University – 10200 
\ TURKEY  
2 The countries in the Eurozone as of 2019 are: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, The Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain.  Wikipedia (2019), Eurozone, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone (28.01.2019).  
Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development                                                                                                                        www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1700 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2855 (Online) DOI: 10.7176/JESD 
Vol.10, No.4, 2019 
 
36 
 
In this study, it is observed that the adaptation dynamics of economic and political conditions are tried to be 
determined in order to create a more perfect European Union. It is seen to emphasize in particular that fiscal 
federalism is an inevitable cycle of the European Union integration process. We see that Mali federalism was first 
brought up by Musgrave in 1959 and later this concept was moved to a more systemic position especially for 
Wallace E. Oates (1972). James Buchanan (1995), an economist who defends a separate and autonomous budget 
for constitutional economics, pointed out the importance of financial federalism, especially in ensuring the desired 
integration of the European Union. Moreover, the fact is that Buchanan's approaches these member states' budget 
autonomy and then a financial federalism, as a structural insurance of the Union, would have a dynamic impact 
will confirm the Brexit Concept discussions in the recent European Union. At this stage, however, the necessity of 
handling the phenomenon of financial federalism in two different stages emerges. These two approaches in practice 
for the European Union are undoubtedly approaches that can also produce two different effects. For the purposes 
of fiscal federalism, the first of these approaches is to create a Supreme Dominant Union Budget that is binding 
on all member states and on all member states that can only be considered in the concept of European Union; the 
second is each different budgets of the Member States with their own autonomous budget, which present the 
financial alteration contribute to EU (Barbier-Gauchard et al, 2014: 33).  
 
2. The Location of the Fiscal Federalism in Eurozone and The Budget Balances in The Fiscal Structural 
Alteration 
Fiscal federalism is usually defined as a system of financial relations between the central level and other levels of 
government in the public administration. This concept, if it is asked to consider especially to Eurozone, which 
means that the central Europa countries should have a sufficiently high budget to perform functions on the other 
member countries. The desired aim especially in this point that are meaningful for Europa Unity is the other 
regional European countries that should be controlled budgets perform functions in the whole financial regions 
(Barbier-Gauchard et al, 2014: 33). Financial federalism on the budgetary policies related to the European Union 
countries also means that the financial powers of the member states are combined under one roof, but also have 
different budgets authority. In this respect, the phenomenon of financial federalism within the European Union on 
the basis of public budgets is different from the classical federal structure including the absolute budget union. 
 
2.1. Interregional Financial Federal Process as Related to Centralized Budget Transfers 
Although the phenomenon of federalism expresses a political and economic difference as application in Eurozone 
but it is emphasized as an important sign of public financial autonomy as financial federalism. This approach is an 
important reason why a collective budget concept is subject to legal collective sanctions. For the European Union, 
a different level of fiscal continental autonomy at the financial level or a common European Union for different 
national budget understandings and its different levels of profit are understood. In this context, addressing the 
financial federalism on the basis of the European Union raises the fact that a common monetary union is inevitable 
in terms of budgetary policies. However, the nature of budgetary transfers in the process of fiscal federalism has a 
positive effect on the impact scale of social transfers, in addition to increasing the limits of public expenditures 
(European Parliament, 2010: 14-15). However, less developed countries, which share the same currency (Euro-) 
area, use their financial transfers that direct to investments more than some social transfers.  
These preferences of countries with significant budget deficits in the Eurozone using financial transfers also 
bring up the necessity of a more flexible federal financial structure in the Eurozone. It is observed that the mutual 
financial transfers made to these countries' budgets from the central budgets of the member countries for a possible 
financial crisis are transformed into a selective structure with the change between the countries (or regions) or the 
preferences timed periodically.   This structure of the selective financial transfers in the Eurozone region 
necessitated structural change, which should be more flexible in the implementation of fiscal federalism. This 
phenomenon is undoubtedly extending the practice of financial federalism far beyond the ongoing framework with 
federated rules and broadening the financial basis of regional cohesion directed to increase fiscal transfers (Veld, 
2007: 1) 
This point is the main issue of the criticisms of the European Union members, especially for financial budget 
tariff applications. Because, this structural situation appears to occur in two different positions in practice: The 
first is the monetary value transfers of the member countries, which still do not use the euro - or want not to use as 
the common currency. Because the public budgets of these countries face a significant depreciation with national 
currencies. The second is the structural financial problems arising from the differences of the contribution levels 
of a common upper Union budget. At this point, the financial transfers of the central budget in a federal financial 
process show different sensitivities depending on the impact of the applied federal rules (Ershova, 2018: 412-413). 
In other words, the flexibility of the rules of fiscal federalism regarding the harmonization process of countries in 
the Eurozone region also determines the level of financial transfers from central national budgets. Therefore, the 
harmonization of regional budgets with the flexibility of the rules of financial federalism makes the financial limits 
related to between the federated regions meaningful via central budgets, which mean to form the core of fiscal 
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federalism. It is possible to form and monitor this interregional financial federal process through centralized budget 
relations in figure 1, below: 
               
               Source: Strategie, F. (2016), What Model for The Future of The Eurozone?, December 2016, 
                          pp.1-2; Dessus, S. and Varoudakis, A. (2013), Protecting Public Investment against Shocks in 
                             the West African Economic and Monetary Union: Options for Fiscal Rules and Risk Sharing 
                             Policy Research Working Paper 6562 The World Bank Africa Region Poverty Reduction and 
                             Economic Management Department & Development Economics Vice Presidency Operations 
                             and Strategy Team, August 2013, p. 17.  
Figure 1. The Sensitivity of Centralized Budget Transfers within Fiscal Federalism Process 
The level of financial transfers of central national budgets for sustaining fiscal federalism is increasing or 
decreasing with the flexibility of federated rules in terms of continuity. In the Eurozone region, between the 
member states (or regions), the rules and flexibility between the implementation weight of the fiscal rules and the 
central national budget have a special sanction for the budgets of the federal states. Countries such as Greece, 
Lithuania and Spain in the Eurozone region are among the countries that have most benefited from the advantages 
of financial flexibility in the framework of fiscal federalism (Feyrer and Sacerdote, 2013: 127). In other words, 
these countries have been the subject of significant financial advantages of flexible fiscal federated support, 
although they do not provide almost no tiers of national central government budgets in the Eurozone region.  
To sum up, in the processes dominated considerably by the rules of fiscal federalism, the flexibility in the 
implementation of financial federalism have increased and it is seen that this increase positively affects the 
distribution scale of the countries or regions. This recently increasing impact scale has resulted in increased demand 
for federal applications with increased flexibility in the Eurozone region (Grauwe and Ji 2016: 5). For the countries 
in Eurozone, this situation appears to have caused two important structural problems on the basis of financial 
transfers. The first of these is related to financial transfers in which is a very flexible financial federalism process 
that creates (or will create) a significant financial burden on developed countries (European Commission, 2014: 
6). Indeed, there is widespread opinion among the official financial practitioners like budget masters that this is 
the main reason for the Brexit practice in the UK.  
In this context, because the central government budget lags behind a financial federated set of rules, it is seen 
as a loss of financial resources, as well as a significant loss of financial jurisdiction, as well as for the UK. The 
second is that the countries in the Eurozone region, which do not have a homogeneous income distribution, cannot 
present a sufficiently homogenous compatible infrastructure to create a federated financial structure at the desired 
level. This shortcoming would transform into more meaningful contradictions, especially in the base of 
underdeveloped and non-compliant countries including insufficient financial reform efforts like Turkey (European 
Commission, 2018-b: 113). This process, which the federated financial structure is adversely affected by the 
financial transfers aimed at the Eurozone region, has transformed into an unfair financial getting advantage process 
as an external process in which these countries with budget deficits have slowed down the process of being 
harmony.  
 
2.2. The Compatibility Process of Fiscal Federalism in Eurozone and Its Alteration Dynamics 
The concerned criticisms in interregional financial federal process with structural harmonization problems directed 
to the compatibility process of fiscal federalism are considered as a major financial federalism problem in the 
European Union. For the European Union, a budget for sanctions over national public budgets can be considered 
a common financial market discipline for Continental Europe (Bijlsma and Zwart, 2013: 3).  
The most important financial element in ensuring the common fiscal discipline is undoubtedly the value that 
the common currency is performing for all member states. All fiscal policies of the member states, including public 
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debt management, can offer unfair financial benefits to the more advanced countries in the Euro Area region. The 
priority is to ensure a common fiscal federalism in a monetary triangle cycle in the euro area. These triple pillars 
of fiscal federalism can be expressed through prudential monetary policies and directed commercial markets in a 
clear financial management process. In the Eurozone region, the flow of capital to the desired level on the basis of 
the member states of the European Union, -as the result of the political and financial- effects has not reached the 
desired level (European Commission 2014: 3-4). One of the most important negative dynamics in the formation of 
a financial federalism in the Eurozone region appears to be this phenomenon. On the other hand, this phenomenon, 
in contrast to the financial federal structure, now displays a structure that supports economic nationalism. This also 
turns out to be captive trade limits protection where the adaptation process for financial federalism is also adversely 
affected. In the light of this approach, we can express the process of adaptation and interaction between financial 
federalism in the Eurozone region and the countries in Figure 2 below. 
 
 
               Source: Ad van Riet (2015), Market-preserving fiscal federalism in the European Monetary Union,  
                            MPRA Paper No. 77772, Munich Personal RePEc Archive MPRA, posted 22 March 2017, 
                            Oesterreichische Nationalbank, Vienna, 30 October 2015 p. 118. 
Figure 2. The Structural Compatibility Dynamics of Fiscal Federalism and Its Alteration Process 
The primary objective in providing a financial federalism in the Eurozone region, as it is observed in Figure 
2, is that they have a common macro policy, which is equipped with the common financial building blocks of the 
respective Eurozone countries. A fiscal federal alignment between the countries in the Eurozone has made 
inevitable a process in which macroeconomic policies are supported by prudent macroeconomic policies. This 
process is a process for supporting the economic effect location of national financial budgets rather than a structural 
alteration process. A single market target in the Eurozone region has needed two important implementation 
dynamics at this stage in the recently years. Single monetary union including the whole macro monetary policy 
rules in Eurozone applications, or single currency. The structural difference between these two phenomena has 
occurred at the stage of implementation and distinguishes the single currency preference from the single monetary 
policy approach, but without included in the whole monetary policy rules. However, the formation of a common 
budget policy in the Eurozone region also complicates a balanced financial risk policy among countries.  
The main reason for this situation is that the structural change policies of each country towards the common 
budget policies in the framework of financial federalism are different. As we mentioned, inter-country disparities, 
such as unemployment rates and economic growth, also affect the financial transfer policies among countries. At 
this stage, countries are reluctant to fulfil the high financial responsibilities required for the fulfilment of national 
public obligations. Indeed, the latest developments in the European Union confirm this situation. Unfortunately, 
the financial federalism has functioned on the countries with lower authority distribution in the provision of 
monetary union as a negative process from recently years. At this stage, as we have already mentioned, the scope-
detail difference between a common currency and a common monetary policy for fiscal federalism is the biggest 
handicap to the adaptation process and differentiates the transnational advantages provided from financial 
federalism. Italy, for example, as a Eurozone region country, is not an equal responsibility as a net-direct 
beneficiary of European Union funds. In contrast, the recently seen situation in Ireland is on contrary to the Italy's 
present situation, because Ireland has fallen outside of the Eurozone as a country that is not net-direct beneficiary 
of financial funds (Dreyer and Schmid, 2015: 521). This position of these countries, which are subject to different 
financial burdens as net contributors to the Eurozone region, is not sufficient to explain the deviations due to a 
financial federalism, even if it is explained by the difference in development.  
Furthermore, the search for different financial policies should also be considered in the search for an 
externally based justification on the basis of the European Union. However, overcoming problems related to 
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common monetary union and ensuring a real compatibility is not a problematic issue that can be solved with 
monetary policies outside the Eurozone. The United States, which is a major reason for seeking a more stable 
common currency in the recent period, does not seem to be a justified approach as a matter of this situation. Even 
though the existence of a common European monetary policy from the beginning of the last century to the 1930s 
was interpreted in this position, the existence and up-to-date alignment of the financial federalism in Eurozone 
today depends more on the common monetary policy integrity than on a common currency. Prudent monetary 
policies and the mandatory structure of trade options have inevitably a role in the evident in this process of financial 
federalism. Addressing the adaptation process of fiscal federalism and the dynamics of change outside this 
structural triangle, which is the common cornerstones of which we are addressing, pushes the national budget 
activities of the countries in the Eurozone region out of the region. This phenomenon is also an important structural 
adjustment problem for a common Eurozone constitution that is intended to be established on the basis of fiscal 
federalism, and has manipulated inevitable the search for different sources of financial resources and debt from 
different regions, as a fiscal federalism matter. At this stage, the existence of a realistic financial federalism has 
made inevitable a reorganization of a functional common European Agreement in which the financial functions of 
the European Union are addressed more clearly and realistically towards to occur the single market via this 
concerned structural triangle. However, the functions of a federal superstructure that keeps fiscal federalism on the 
agenda face to be limited in an internal consistency with the country's tradition and common financial values.  
 
3. Expectations directed to financial federalism in the Eurozone region and Probable Discusses on The 
National Budgets 
This negative probability in the Eurozone region for financial federalism is that countries using the common 
currency (Euro) are subject to different impact scales against a possible regional devaluation. Partly, except for a 
common absolute monetary policy, the countries using the currency of the relevant currency have demonstrated 
meaningful arguments in terms of their national losses for years. This situation, which is a very important element 
in the failure report of a financial federalism aimed at securing a single market economy, has also disrupted regional 
commercial protectionism and has recently highlighted national subjective trade. Undoubtedly, this fact 
emphasizes the need for future fiscal federalism and the need to redesign national budgets in Eurozone. 
 
3.1.  Budgetary Development related to the Fiscal Federalism in Eurozone and Common Correlations 
Structural factors such as the development difference in the Eurozone region have divided the budgets of the 
member countries into different equilibrium distributions as a common value. In the Eurozone's countries where 
all structural changes are different, net transaction values related to the budget are directly affected by this situation. 
For the Eurozone, this situation can be evaluated in two different cases related to the financial federalism. In the 
process of fiscal federalism, the decision-making countries, the public deficits are extremely low countries and the 
countries that directly benefit from the decisions on financial federalism especially in strategical financial decision 
process. This approach is also seen as the cause of deviations in the common correlation values and increases the 
negative burden of increasing Euro values on less developed countries (Checherita and Rother, 2010: 15). This 
significant financial fact has caused of budget deficits in countries, such as Lithuania, is an important cause, and 
this phenomenon has been a main matter of discussions in recently years especially directed to be perceived the 
fiscal federalism. The second approach is related to the problems in the financial alteration agenda due to the 
distribution of Euro-based capital flows between countries, which cause bigger development differences. In brief, 
the problem with him is a serious development difference and the negative aberrations that this situation poses on 
the common financial correlations (Cimadomo et al, 2018: 93). In these deviations, a financial federalism approach 
has been insufficient directed to ensuring a common fiscal federalism, and it is observed that the euro has a negative 
impact on real capital in these countries due to inflationary effects on countries such as Lithuania, Poland, Hungary 
and Croatia. National Income, as a dependent variable at this stage, is an important determinant of capital inflow 
and lower the correlation values between possible budget deficits and fiscal federalism and the structural 
correlation process (Lane, 2013: 12). In Figure 3, it is possible to see the relationship of Eurozone countries, and 
its distribution of net budget balances in the last decade based meaningful criteria. 
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Source: D'Apice, Pasquale (2016), Budget-related cross-border flows: EU versus US, VOX  CEPR Policy Portal 
Research-based Policy Analysis and Commentary from Leading Economists, 13 September 2016, 
https://voxeu.org/article/budget-related-cross-border-flows-eu-versus-us (23.01.2019). 
Figure 3. Net Operating Budget Balances and Its Relations GNI per Capita in Eurozone 
As seen on figure 3, deviations arising from the development difference of the member countries are seen as 
an important reason for the budget deficits, and as the growth rate decreases the increase in budget deficits is 
growing as a correlation related. This correlation balance due to National Income is high in countries such as 
France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Italy, Denmark and the UK, which are considered as the main 
core countries of the European Union. However, in other countries that were joined in later where the Union has a 
low level of Euro effect, the net negative effect on net budget values is increasing. For the Eurozone region, the 
effects of fiscal federalism on the respective countries' budgets can be explained by an inverse relationship on a 
GNI per capita basis. In other words, the increase in the level of significance "R2" as the advanced level increases 
as an important variable has caused a non-homogenous Eurozone region.   
It is possible to reveal this phenomenon with GNI per capita coefficient and the net budget balance is seen to 
grow GNI per capita income ratio decreases. Undoubtedly, the assessment of net budget balances based on the 
Euro currency (€) is also very important in the same process. In briefly, as a common correlation, fiscal federalism 
creates a more significant scale of impact in countries where it is more effective per capita and provides a fairer 
distribution of central budget burden. It is not a coincidence that net operational budget deficit is high in less 
developed countries compared to other countries. In these countries, the correlation values for budget burden are 
higher and more negative. The fiscal budget burden is effected by national income distribution, and this sharing of 
fiscal burden produce more negative effect on the poor citizen, which mean to reveal the fiscal uncongenial. At 
this stage, these less developed countries in Eurozone have entered into a different structural search for their central 
national budgets, which try to abandon the Euro currency or to move their national currencies to a more convertible 
position. It can be said that this phenomenon is an important cause of the possible deviation up to "0.59" in "R2".  
It appears that in new member countries the time taken for being member in the Eurozone countries and also the 
subsequent time for the completion of the common monetary and financial institutionalization had a direct impact 
on the balance coefficient and the balance of net budget transactions. In this respect, the negative deviations in the 
increasing net budget values of the new member countries in the Eurozone region should be comment as prominent 
and meaningful deviations. These are countries with institutional shortcomings on the basis of institutional 
integration and development in terms of fiscal federalism, and these are also the cause of significant deviations in 
the institutional alignment of financial federal activities in Eurozone. 
 
3.2. Corporate Common Fiscal Goals and The Deviations in The Process of Fiscal Federalism 
It is understood that the deviations in the Eurozone region for the common financial objectives have emerged in 
institutional positions where a heterogeneous macro infrastructure is generally present. At this stage, it is important 
to say that the deviations of macro-common values between countries (unemployment rate, inflation, etc.) are a 
result of higher costs incurred by countries with lower chance of competition. In the other word, a heterogeneous 
federal infrastructure has transformed the process-related changes such as unemployment insurance and regional 
labour market regulations into an even more unified structure for years, but this phenomenon will be able to further 
enhance structural contradictions due to differences. Obviously, a more feasible federal infrastructure for the 
Eurozone emerges as a result of fewer national sanctions in which there is a lower market competition (Hayek, 
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1948: 266). This phenomenon of financial change increases the costs of adaptation to the federal structure of the 
least developed countries in the Eurozone region by turning a financial region change with high financial costs. 
Even more, the national decisions taken by the member states for the provision of a financial federalism has 
remained insufficient and the effectiveness of the precautionary policies they have taken against the common 
monetary union becomes meaningless. This is because there is no common agreement between the dynamics in 
the provision of financial federalism, and this also destroys the Euro's monetary value balance for the countries.  It 
is possible to emphasize and explain the deviations related to the financial federalism process in the scope of 
applications in the Eurozone region as follows:  
Deviations related to Tax Bases and Exclusive Tax Bases with Shared Tax Bases:   It can be said that the most 
important financial mismatch phenomenon in the process of financial federalism within the scope of common 
objectives is to provide a common tax base for the regionally-targeted taxes. These concerned to matter as fiscal 
deviations cause some different tax applications like different tax rates, which mean to be busy with not action the 
national tax with national budgets as to fiscal federalism. It is imperative that countries with a common currency 
should have, as a financial necessity, common financial applications integrity as well as social impact levels of 
taxes require to have equivalent criteria. However, the aimed tax revenues targets based on national budgets are 
far from practices in the common tax base in the Eurozone.  This financial phenomenon has deviated significantly 
the impact of a federal financial structure on the Eurozone (Franks et al, 2018: 21). To future of Eurozone the 
undesired fiscal applications have been keeping increase for recent years to bring up the common fiscal practices 
forming effects on especially less developed countries as negative effects.  As these formed results, the less 
developed countries have to take on more financial burdens than others, which means to more negative effects via 
common currency -as Euro- as directed to the fiscal federalism. From this angle, this discussed financial 
phenomenon has supplied the harmonization problems directed to the future of fiscal federalism in Eurozone.  
Deviations Related to Revenue Sharing Arrangements in The Tax Revenue Resources: Although the 
countries' tax resources are generally the same, these countries that are in Eurozone appear to have different levels 
of impact in the Eurozone with different forms of implementation. The fact that tax resources are subject to changes 
is the result of differences and practices in the proportionate value of tax revenues within the national income of 
the country concerned in the Eurozone. In other words, the weighted proportional differences of the sectoral 
structures of countries are interpreted as differences of tax resources. These concerned Federal deviations from the 
harmonization process for a federal financial structure in the implementation of common financial objectives 
emerge from direct tax-related values, such as employment and price policies, and unfortunately the countries in 
the Eurozone are increasingly differentiating tax practices. This process, in which the autonomous structure of 
national budgetary practices is prominent, is a process in which the intended federal financial structure in the 
Eurozone returns to a vicious circle as related to financial applications. At this stage, it is a matter of important 
debate and federal financial deviations in which the financial resources are or will be the priority for the primary 
fiscal common objectives in the Eurozone. In addition, the importance considerably of the practice is seen in the 
indirect taxes, and this phenomenon differentiates the commodity-capital markets in the Eurozone (European 
Central Bank,  2016: 57-58). The fact that the common tax resources and revenues in the Eurozone are subject to 
different budgets in the goods and wraps market are the areas where financial federalism is most deviated. This 
structure, which adversely affects the joint sharing of regional tax resources, also leads to significant financial loss 
in terms of federated financial practices as related to incompatible tax adjustments. 
Deviations Related to Tax Expenditures as an Add Fiscal Burden Harmonization: Deviations directed to 
federal financial purposes in the Eurozone also reveal significant from the costs of differences that can come on 
the scene from the tax exceptions and tax exemptions. As the tax expenditure phenomenon means to give up some 
of the taxes to be taken, it can say that the tax exemption and tax exemption differences arising from tax practices 
in the Eurozone also cause significant deviations. This financial phenomenon is an important additional financial 
burden in the Eurozone, particularly for the less developed countries, and is also the basis for these countries' 
significant compliance issue objections to a federal financial structure (European Commission, 2015: 17). This 
process, in which different income expectations for national budgets have come to the forefront, also direct the 
financial transfers expected from a co-federated budget with the different position of the possible open positions 
of each country's budget. As a clearer approach the limits of the financial expectations of less developed countries 
from a common fiscal federated budget have been shaped according to these fiscal expectations of these countries 
for a long time. The financial burden for the Eurozone to the provision of financial federalism is a bilateral financial 
burden and imposes ground for practices outside of the common financial structure related to the fiscal deviated 
alterations as in Spain (Haug and Nesse, 2016: 57). This phenomenon, which creates an additional financial burden, 
disrupts the adaptation process, while increasing the scale of the commodity-capital market with the countries 
outside of the Eurozone, and this fact has raised the search for different areas where the tax expenditures will have 
positive impacts (Barriors et al, 2016: 11). Therefore, the fiscal federalism has been main subject to of the federal 
financial structure alterations as some significant reason deviations in the Eurozone in the recent years. 
Deviations Related to use of federal spending power on the basis of Financial Transfers:  Despite the common 
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currency values in the Eurozone, financial transfers to less developed countries have been to subject to different 
political practices. This phenomenon has two meanings in practice. The first problem is what countries and how 
the distribution of financial transfers in the region is directed. Is it possible to put forth the criteria for the loss of 
financial in condition to be clearly in Eurozone? Or is this structural formation shaped by political regional 
expectations? It is not possible to find the answer to these questions in a federal financial structure in the Eurozone 
for recently years. Because the regional distribution criteria of financial transfers of the current federal financial 
structure are not clear (Devesa, 2016: 13). On the other hand, it should be questioned whether the regional federated 
financial power distribution is also equal in the expenditure and use of financial transfers under a common federal 
budget. Because, as related to the federal financial structure in the Eurozone is a reality in the implementation 
processes in which the country where the budgetary responsibility is shared and the countries where spending 
authorities are shared are different. The differences in budgetary responsibilities and spending powers in the 
Eurozone region of Greece in the past years is a good example of questioning the federal financial structure 
(Hawkesworth et al, 2008: 43). In this context, it is observed that the spending power in practice is based and 
formed on structurally constituent countries for the Eurozone region. This concept currently leads to significant 
deviations from the use of financial authority directed to fiscal federalism applications, which means also to break 
into the fiscal distribution, as negative process, in Eurozone.  
 
4. Conclusion 
The relationship of a financial federal structure with national budgets in the Eurozone region varies according to 
the process in which the federal structure is implemented and the countries governing this process. Efforts to create 
a common federal district budget for further consolidation of a common currency use ground are affected to a 
different extent from the different dynamics of the Eurozone region and cause different deviations. In this process, 
the position and financial position of national budgets constitute an impact that cannot be ignored and a federal 
financial structure in the Eurozone region sometimes causes some hurled financial applications. On the other hand, 
the development gap (or differences) between countries also differentiates the financial impact levels of the budgets 
of countries in the Eurozone region, and these less developed countries have been exposed to higher financial 
burdens on their national budgets. This financial phenomenon has occurred two important consequences for the 
federal financial structure in the Eurozone region.  
The first of these developments is that due to the possible budget deficits of the less developed countries 
desire that their national currencies should also be a priority in commercial-financial affairs and take own measures 
for possible financial burdens in the contrary to the Eurozone federal dynamics. The effect of the use of Euro 
require, as a common currency on these countries with budget deficits, to require taking measures to counteract 
the financial burdens arising from the common federal financial structure rather than the structural change in these 
countries. These structural deviations have been seen to be an important cause of financial contradiction, and it is 
observed that this fact cause the financial transfers in the Eurozone region have caused deviations from the real 
practicing fields with objectives of fiscal federalism applications in especially recent years.  
Secondly, the contribution of Eurozone practices to the formation of a federal budget has increased the 
negative consequences of tax mismatches recently. In fact, the regional impact level of Euro use, and the fact that 
Euro preferences may cause more significant financial deficits among countries is an issue that has been frequently 
discussed in recent years because of this specific of action contradictions. In addition, undoubtedly the differences 
in the tax base of the countries in the Eurozone region are also directly related to the national income as related to 
the financial burdens between these countries. In this context, the regional existence of financial federalism causes 
deviations in the financial power of the countries due to the differences in monetary policies. In this respect, the 
flexibility of national budgets associated with national income in the face of financial federalism has also directly 
has been affecting the levels of national contribution in the provision of a common federated budget in the 
Eurozone region for a long time. Targeting common target financial correlations on the countries of the region 
adversely affects the regional conservationist structure. The lack of an absolute monetary union and the deviations 
in the distribution of fiscal authority can be said to be one of the possible reasons for these national concerns. 
Regional negative correlations of economic and financial transactions and the distant forms of structural 
adjustment policies have undermined the structural change policies in the Eurozone region. At this point, it is seen 
that the less developed countries aim to bring their fiscal reforms to the forefront in order to increase their monetary 
conversions by moving their national budgets to a stable position rather than providing the common dynamics of 
a federal financial structure. 
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